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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the exclusion of economic and social rights from peacebuilding. The 
peacebuilding process has become dominated by a liberal agenda resulting in a 'one size fits 
all' model of peacebuilding. As a consequence, the inclusion of human rights within the 
mandate of peacebuilding has also been limited to a liberal conception of human rights 
constituting only civil and political rights. It is argued that an alternative approach is 
required which refocuses the peacebuilding agenda on human security: a hybrid 'human 
security plus' approach to peacebuilding (or a 'inclusive’ human rights approach) will ensure 
the protection and promotion of economic, social and cultural rights, whilst maintaining 
protection of civil and political rights, throughout the whole peacebuilding process,: from 
peace agreements to post-conflict reconstruction. The result will be a reclaiming of the 
peacebuilding agenda in order to improve its effectiveness and provide a legal framework for 
building positive peace. 
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The concept of peacebuilding has multiple interpretations ranging from ideas of narrow and 
short-term programs focusing on establishing democratic institutions, the rule of law and free 
market economic development, to the broad and all-encompassing ideas of addressing 
structural violence with the aim of positive peace and human security. Because of the nature 
of the field and the international actors involved it has been suggested that the peacebuilding 
process has become dominated by a liberal agenda resulting in a 'one size fits all' model of 
peacebuilding which focusses on international security and containment of conflict. 
Furthermore, as a consequence, the inclusion of human rights within the mandate of 
peacebuilding has also been limited to a liberal conception of human rights1 constituting only 
civil and political rights. As such the need to address the protection and promotion of 
economic, social and cultural rights as a means to ensure sustainable peace has been omitted 
or at best marginalized from the field.  
 
                                                          
1 The term liberal is used here to define a conception of rights which is limited to classic civil liberties 
and freedoms, such as the right to life, freedom from torture, freedom of speech, personal liberty and 
property and a minimal role for the state in terms of positive human rights obligations. 
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In similar fashion previously there has also been a tendency to view transitional justice as 
narrow, legalistic and short-term2 and therefore limited in scope. Although the concept of 
transitional justice is open to interpretation3 the overriding approach has also been one of 
liberalism based on the rule of law, democracy and civil and political rights.4 More recently 
there have been attempts to challenge this conception of transitional justice and to broaden its 
remit to include alternative visions of justice such as, social justice; justice for violations of 
economic and social rights and justice for economic crimes and corruption.5 In this way the 
dominant agenda of transitional justice had been challenged. However, transitional justice is 
only one pillar or cornerstone of peacebuilding:6 ‘a response to systematic or widespread 
violations of human rights. It seeks recognition for victims and promotion of possibilities for 
peace, reconciliation and democracy’.7 Its focus is on responding to grave violations of 
                                                          
2 Waldorf. L, ‘Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs’ (2012) 21:2 
Social and Legal Studies 171-186, 179. 
3 For example see International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Fact Sheet ‘What is 
Transitional Justice?’ (ICTJ 2009) at https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-
Justice-2009-English.pdf, last accessed 02/11/15; Arthur, P, ‘How Transitions Reshaped Human 
Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice’ (2009) 31:2 Human Rights Quarterly 321; Bell. 
C, ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the state of the “Field” or “Non-Field” (2009) 3:1 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 5-27; Teitel. R, ‘Theoretical and International 
Frameworks – Transitional Justice in a New Era’ (2002) 26 Fordham International Law Journal  893; 
L. Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’ (2007) 40(1) International Law 
and Politics 1, 3; T. Olsen, L. Payne and A. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance– Comparing 
Processes, Weighing Effi cacy (US Institute of Peace Press 2010) 12. 
4 Cahill-Ripley. A, ‘Foregrounding Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice: Realising Justice 
for Violations of Economic and Social Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly Human Rights, 32:2, June 
2014, 183-213. 
5 Editorial, (2012) 6(1) International Journal of Transitional Justice (IJTJ) 1-10. 
6 Roddy Brett & Lina Malagon, ‘Overcoming the Original Sin of the “Original Condition:” How 
Reparations May Contribute to Emancipatory Peacebuilding’, Hum Rights Rev (2013) 14:257–271, 
p.258; Schmid. E, ‘Liberia’s Truth Commission Report: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
Transitional Justice’ (2009) XXIV Praxis – The Fletcher Journal of Human Security 5-28; Laplante. 
L.J, ‘Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots 
of Violence through a Human Rights Framework’ (2008) 2 The International Journal of Transitional 
Justice, 331,  347; Sharp. D, ‘Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition: Toward A 
Positive-Peace Paradigm for Transitional Justice’ (2012) 35 Fordham International Law Journal, 
780-814, 781. 
7 International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Fact Sheet ‘What is Transitional Justice?’ (ICTJ 
2009) at https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf 
last accessed 02/11/15 
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human rights that have occurred in the past but, clearly, transitional justice also has a role to 
play in acting as a springboard for other peacebuilding methods. 
As such, what remains lacking is a critique of how economic and social rights have been 
dealt with (or not) within other peacebuilding measures and within the overall process of 
peacebuilding. Further, what are the consequences of this for the effectiveness of 
peacebuilding programmes?  
 
This article will begin with an exploration of the definition of peacebuilding and a critical 
examination of the current liberal agenda. The author will subsequently analyse the 
implications of this approach for consideration of economic and social rights. Further the  
impact of this dominant liberal model upon the effectiveness of peacebuilding measures will 
be assessed. The second part of the article examines alternative conceptions of peacebuilding, 
focussing on the human security approach. Using a combination of this human security 
approach and economic and social rights, in section three the author will propose a new 
framework for peacebuilding: a hybrid ‘human security plus’ or ‘inclusive’ human rights 
model which includes justice mechanisms necessary for transition and peace but also 
encompasses additional legal and non-legal measures for building peace. The final section of 
the article then explores how to operationalise such an approach before drawing some 
conclusions. It is submitted that the proposed ‘human security plus’ approach can assist in 
reuniting all elements of peacebuilding – from peace agreements to post-conflict 
reconstruction and including transitional justice: A common concern for human security will 
support the  emergence of a holistic and inclusive process. Such a model will offer a 
framework for the protection and promotion of economic and social rights within all stages of 
peacebuilding. Moreover, it is argued that a re-focussing of the priorities for peacebuilding on 
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human security rather than international security will be of benefit for all, most especially 
those currently marginalised in the overriding liberal idea of peacebuilding. 
2. THE DOMINANCE OF THE LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING AGENDA AND 
THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF PEACE 
In the search to find out why economic and social rights have been marginalised throughout 
the wider peacebuilding process it is necessary to define what is meant by peacebuilding8 and 
explore what the aims of peacebuilding are. Newman states that international peacebuilding 
in conflict prone, transitional or post-conflict society is aimed at ‘preventing the resumption 
or escalation of violent conflict and establishing a durable and self-sustaining peace.’9 He 
notes that peacebuilding programmes can include tasks to support development and 
humanitarian assistance, promote security and strengthen governance and the rule of law 
through activities including supporting peace processes, ‘responding to food insecurity; 
responding to acute health concerns; strengthening law and order; promoting and facilitating 
democratic practices; strengthening institutions of justice and legislation; resuming and 
strengthening public service delivery; promoting human rights and reconciliation; addressing 
land reform claims; and constitutional drafting or amendments.’ 10 
 
However, many would argue that peacebuilding is usually based upon a narrow perspective 
of ending direct and open violence; what Galtung would term ‘negative peace’.11 Moreover, 
many would argue that this is the limit of what peacebuilding can achieve. Critics of a 
                                                          
8 See Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell, and Laura Sitea, ‘Peacebuilding: What Is 
in a Name?’ Global Governance , 13 (2007), 35–58 outlining the different definitions and approaches 
to peacebuilding. 
9 Newman. E, ‘A Human Security Peace-Building Agenda’, Third World Quarterly, 32:10, 2011, 
1737-1756, 1738. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Galtung.J, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’ (1969) 6:3 Journal of Peace Research, 167-191. 
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broader conception of peacebuilding argue that concerns over development, poverty and 
basic needs are the concerns of policy for the state and represent long term goals as oppose to 
the short term goals of a peacebuilding programme.12 Similar arguments have been made 
concerning transitional justice.13 However as Newman argues, ‘social welfare shortcomings 
can jeopardise overall peacebuilding objectives, obstruct the consolidation of peace and 
contribute to doubts about the legitimacy of peacebuilding programmes.’14 It is also the case 
that if basic needs are not addressed through a legal rights-based framework, they can easily 
become resigned to less important long-term aims rather than becoming fundamental 
obligations to be realised in order to aid transition to peace, to enable justice and to sustain 
peace. 
 
The current prevailing approach to peacebuilding is based upon a liberal agenda which 
emphasises democracy, rule of law, free market economics and institution building15. Within 
transitional justice mechanisms it emphasises justice for international crimes, violations of 
civil and political rights and the dominance of international – led interventions based on 
similar liberal principles. However, many scholars and practitioners and local stakeholders 
have criticised this approach as paying ‘insufficient attention to basic and everyday human 
needs’:16  For example, Richmond argues that liberal peacebuilding has failed to ‘engage 
either with local cultural practices of peacemaking or with the manifold insecurities of 
                                                          
12  See UN Peacebuilding Commission, pp.32-33, infra note 143, 144. 
13 Waldorf, supra note 2. 
14  Newman, supra note 9, 1737. 
15 Roland Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International Security, 
Vol. 22, No. 2. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 54-89, at 56; Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Emancipatory Forms of 
Human Security and Liberal Peacebuilding’, International Journal, Vol. 62, No. 3, What Kind of 
Security? Afghanistan and Beyond (Summer, 2007), pp. 458-477, at 462; Mac Ginty. R, ‘Hybrid 
peace: the interaction between top-down and bottom-up Peace’, Security Dialogue, 41 (2010) p.391-
412 at 393. 
16 Newman, supra note 9, 1737. 
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everyday life in societies emerging from conflict.’17 Brett and Malagon argue this liberal 
peacebuilding agenda results in interventions based upon liberal democracy and those 
concepts and rights that define it, i.e. a focus on civil and political rights whilst ‘Broader 
rights frames, including socio-economic and collective rights, have systematically been side-
lined from peace settlements and from the concurrent state-building enterprises of Liberal 
Peace politics, as well as from accompanying TJMs [transitional justice mechanisms]’.18  
This results in a ‘restricted human rights framework’.19  Post-conflict peacebuilding 
programmes focus on the rule of law, reform of the police and judiciary, installing democratic 
institutions and retraining personnel and development (outside of a rights-based framework). 
If economic and social concerns are addressed it tends to be as part of social policy aims, 
rather than through an economic and social rights based framework integral to the 
peacebuilding process.20  
 
This ‘limited’ human rights framework is also a result of historic debates surrounding the 
legal status of economic and social rights and the notion that such rights are non-justiciable. 
The argument that these rights are not ‘real’ or ‘legal’ rights or at best constitute secondary 
rights – general aims to be achieved progressively as the ideal standard,21 cannot be sustained 
                                                          
17 Richmond in Selby. J, ‘The myth of liberal peace-building’, Conflict, Security and Development, 13 
(1), 2013, 57-86, 63;  Richmond.O, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’ Review of 
International Studies, 35(3) 557-580. 
18 Brett & Malagon, supra note 6, 258. See also Richmond O, Maintaining Order, London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005; Richmond O, The transformation of peace, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005. 
19 Mac Ginty, supra note 15, 391-412. 
20 For example, in the current countries on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission only 
Burundi mentions human rights as a priority of the instrument of engagement. Within the Final 
Outcome Document of the 5th Review of the Strategic Framework,  human rights and the rule of law 
is separated from the ‘Social and economic peacebuilding issues, Second poverty reduction strategy 
paper and socio-economic reintegration of vulnerable groups.’. See Peacebuilding Commission Fifth 
session Burundi configuration 21 April 2011, Outcome of the fifth review of the implementation of 
the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, PBC/5/BDI/2 (26 April 2011), 5. 
21 Arbour, supra note 3, 11; Sharp, supra note 6, 780, 797. 
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in light of the current evidence to the contrary: There is growing recognition of economic and 
social rights within international, regional and national law.22 The adoption of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR23 provides a long-awaited communications mechanism to the main 
international treaty on ESR, therefore reinforcing the justiciability of such rights.24 Further 
there is now substantial jurisprudence within regional and national courts dealing with ESR 
directly or through the application of civil and political rights provisions.25  The latter also 
highlights the indivisibility of human rights as noted in numerous instruments of international 
human rights law.26  
 
As such, in answer to the question posed of why economic and social rights and indeed wider 
economic and social issues have been marginalised within peacebuilding, one underlying 
reason is this liberal peacebuilding approach that dominates global responses to conflict and 
                                                          
22 Ssenyonjo. M, ‘Reflections on state obligations with respect to economic, social and cultural rights 
in international human rights law’, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol.15, No.6, August 
2011, 969-1012, 970; Coomans. F (ed), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights – Experiences 
from Domestic Systems, Intersentia: Oxford, 2006; Saiz.I, ‘Rights in Recession? Challenges for 
Economic and Social Rights Enforcement in Times of Crisis’,  Journal of Human Rights Practice, 
Vol.1, No.2, 2009, 277-293, 277.  
23 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2008, 
entry into force 5 May 2013, UNTS Reg Number 1453. 
24 Justiciability should be distinguished from judicialism and can include review outside of the court 
system. See Mapulanga-Hulston. J, ‘Examining the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol.6, No.4, Winter 2002, 29-48, 37. 
25 Ssenyonjo. M, ‘Reflections on state obligations with respect to economic, social and cultural rights 
in international human rights law’, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol.15, No.6, August 
2011, 969-1012, 970. For a comprehensive database of case law on ESCR see ESCR-Net Case-law 
Database  
26 UDHR 1948; ICESCR 1966 PREAMBLE; Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International 
Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3 
(1968). Para.13; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, 
Vienna, 25 June 1993, para.5. See also Whelan. D, Indivisible Human Rights – A History, University 
of Penn Press, 2010; Donnelly. J, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 3rd ed,  Cornell 
Universoty Press, 2013, 31-40.  
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repression.27 Within this liberal approach peacebuilding is framed as international security28. 
The reasoning behind intervention thus becomes the maintenance of international security 
and stability rather than addressing the causes of the particular conflict. Whilst this approach 
results in much needed humanitarian assistance, resources for development and capacity 
building it also results in an emphasis on stability and conflict containment rather than 
conflict resolution.29 Local demands for justice are excluded in favour of externally driven 
top-down processes which focus on dealing with elites and existing leaders and building state 
level institutions. This hampers community driven peace building with alternative or 
conflicting priorities and agendas for peace. Hence the peacebuilding agenda becomes 
externally driven – often a donor led agenda.30  Furthermore, a heavy reliance on top down 
promotion of democracy and market based economic reforms also often ignores local 
priorities and local voices for peace.31  Market reforms can result in exacerbation of existing 
inequality and social grievances. Ill-timed market liberalisation including privatisation or 
public spending cuts in transitional societies can threaten broader peacebuilding goals, such 
as public service delivery.32  
 
As Newman identifies, whilst these methods are often successful in reducing the absolute 
numbers of conflicts on the ground and in terms of negative peace are successful in ending 
open conflict, the record of promoting positive peace – long-term sustainable peace is 
                                                          
27 The perception that economic and social rights are ‘not real’ human rights but rather policy aims 
and the fact that they do not fit with the liberal ideal of human rights has ensured that ESR have not 
been given sufficient attention in TJ and peacebuilding processes.  
28 International security defined as an emphasis on a strong state through effective governance and a 
focus on minimising armed conflict between states rather than a focus on individual human security. 
29 Newman, supra note 9, 1741. 
30 Ibid. 
31  Mac Ginty, supra note 15 at 403. 
32 Newman, supra note 9, 1744.   
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questionable.33 The consequence of such an approach is the advent of fragile peace: weak 
institutions, social unrest, segregation, discrimination, political volatility or stagnation and the 
threat of insecurity.34 That is not to argue that negative peacebuilding is not necessary and it 
is clearly a prerequisite for more transformative peacebuilding. However it results in a fragile 
peace as root causes of conflict, such as economic and social rights violations 
remain.35Therefore, such a framework is ‘ineffective in precipitating structural 
transformation and preventing recurrence of conflict.’36   
 
Another problem is the ‘institutionalist’ approach to peacebuilding.37 This institutionalist 
view assumes that with operational democratic state institutions and free market conditions 
the objectives of peacebuilding will be generated.38 Once key institutions are formally 
achieved for example, citizenship, electoral democracy, free market economics, civil and 
political rights, ‘development will move forward and serve peace’.39 However, democracy 
does not equal peace. In fact societies in transition to democracy are more likely to 
experience conflict and destabilisation. This is especially true of societies with existing 
divisions, social inequality and lack of human rights enjoyment.40  
 
                                                          
33 Ibid, 1739. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Oskar N.T. Thoms & James Ron, ‘Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict?’, Human 
Rights Quarterly, 29 (2007) 674–705 at 676. 
36 Brett & Malagon, supra note 6, 258. 
37 Richmond, supra note 15 at 461. 
38 Newman, supra note 9, 1743. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid.  
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Overall the liberal peacebuilding approach fails to address underlying root causes of conflict, 
structural violence41 and drivers of the conflict such as economic, social and cultural rights 
violations, inequality and discrimination and exclusion42. When the ‘peace dividend is not 
equitably spread’43 the seeds of unrest remain and reconciliation is difficult.  
 
In addition to the debate as to the aims and objectives of peacebuilding, the issue of 
continuity and complementarity of the various elements within the process is significant. 
Selby argues that ‘liberal peace-building discourse mistakenly treats “peacebuilding” as a 
discrete sphere of activity and object of analysis – with important implications.’44  In this way 
peacebuilding becomes ‘abstracted from and privileged over other elements of war-ending 
and peacemaking.’45 Both Galtung46 and previous UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros 
Ghali47 viewed peacebuilding as ‘functionally (and usually also temporally) distinct from 
                                                          
41 Structural violence: ‘The disparities and deaths that result from systems, institutions and policies 
that meet some people’s needs and rights at the expense of others constitute structural violence’. 
Structural violence then creates the conditions for further violence - direct violence such as uprisings, 
revolutions, coups, civil wars and international armed conflict (See Schrich.L, ‘Linking Human 
Rights and Conflict Transformation: A Peacebuilding Framework’, in  Mertus.J and Helsing. J (eds) 
Human Rights and Conflict – Exploring the Links between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding, USIPP: 
Washington D.C, 2006, 63-95, 69).  
42 Cahill-Ripley. A, ‘Foregrounding Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice: Realising Justice 
for Violations of Economic and Social Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly Human Rights, 32:2, June 
2014, 183-213; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Analytical study on human 
rights and transitional justice (United Nations 2009) A/HRC/12/18 para.59; International Council on 
Human Rights Policy, Negotiating Justice? Human Rights and Peace Agreements (International 
Council on Human Rights Policy 2006) 101; Agbakwa. S.C, ‘A Path Least Taken: Economic and 
Social Rights and the Prospects of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Africa’ (2003) 47:1 
Journal of African Law, 38, 40; Laplante, supra note 6, 334-335. 
43 Newman, supra note 9,1745. 
44 Selby. J, ‘The myth of liberal peace-building’, Conflict, Security and Development, 13 (1), 2013, 
57-86, 59. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Galtung, J, ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding’ in 
Galtung and Ejlers, Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research, Vol.2, Copenhagen, 1979, 
282-304. 
47 Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping’ 
Report of the UN Secretary General UN Doc. A/47/277-S24111, 17 June, 1992, paras.21, 20. 
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processes of war-ending.’48 As a consequence peacebuilding is overwhelmingly viewed as a 
post-conflict activity and becomes disjointed with other elements of the conflict 
transformation process such as peace agreements, negotiations and transitional justice 
mechanisms. In depth discussion and analysis of the contents of peace agreements and the 
subsequent obligations for peacebuilding programmes are largely ignored or ‘viewed as 
contextual or subordinate to the logic of the liberal peace-building project.’49 As Selby argues 
it is not sensible to exclude such analysis from international peace negotiations as such 
interventions typically involve many several international actors.50 Moreover, these actors 
also help to give peace agreements legitimacy (irrespective of the terms and content) and the 
granting of legitimacy is a crucial precondition for those parties involved to gain access to 
resources and finance.51  
 
Thus, it is submitted that peacebuilding should be viewed as the overall process which 
encompasses all war ending and peacemaking processes including negotiations, peace 
agreements, legal developments such as bills of rights and other constitutional provisions, 
transitional justice mechanisms, post-conflict reconstruction and institution building, capacity 
building programmes and reconciliation initiatives. In this way peacebuilding would reflect 
more closely the obligations and aims of the peace agreements and transitional justice 
mechanisms and enhance continuity. It would minimise the disengagement of local 
stakeholders and those parties involved in the conflict as it would be inclusive of local 
approaches to peacebuilding as well as international and national approaches. As Selby notes 
                                                          
48 Selby, supra note 44, 64. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 72. 
51 Ibid, 72; 76. 
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peacebuilding should be viewed as ‘war-ending processes in the round’ including those that 
are internationalised and those that are not.52  
 
 
3. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE LIBERAL MODEL: THE HUMAN SECURITY 
APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING 
An alternative approach to peacebuilding is offered by Schirch; 
‘Peacebuilding prevents, reduces, transforms, and helps people to recover from 
violence in all forms, while at the same time empowering peoples to foster 
relationships at all levels to create structural justice…Peacebuilding pursues a just 
peace…[which] recognises that justice pursued violently contributes to further 
injustice and human rights violations, and that peace without justice is unlikely to be 
sustainable or to meet peoples basic needs. Just peace53 exists where a sustainable set 
of structures and processes allows people to meet their basic human needs and 
protects their human rights with an absence of either direct or structural violence. 
Peacebuilding recognises the importance of efforts to reduce direct violence while 
pursuing a deeper transformation of structures, paradigms, cultures and values over a 
longer time frame.’54  
 
                                                          
52 Ibid, 81. 
53 For definitions of the concept of ‘just peace’ as different form positive peace see Yaacov Bar-
Siman-Tov, ‘Just Peace - Linking Justice to Peace’, JAD-PbP Working Paper No. 5, Just and Durable 
Peace by Piece Project 217488 (funded by the Seventh Framework Programme of the European 
Commission), Lund University: Sweden, October 2009, p.4. 
54 Schirch.L, ‘Linking Human Rights and Conflict Transformation – A Peacebuilding Framework’ in 
Mertus.J and Helsing.J (eds) Human Rights and Conflict – Exploring the Links Between Rights, Law 
and Peacebuilding, United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington, 2006, 63-95, 64. 
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This approach to peacebuilding is a more ambitious vision of peacebuilding as transformative 
in nature rather than transitional.  Similar alternative definitions of peacebuilding are offered 
by Lambourne who defines peacebuilding as ‘strategies designed to promote a secure and 
stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent 
conflicts do not recur’ and including both positive and negative peace.55 
 
This is not to argue that liberal peacebuilding is without value. Rather a revaluation is 
required of what liberal peacebuilding actually is and what it should be. One response to the 
challenges and problems raised by liberal peacebuilding is the utilisation of the concept of 
human security as the primary objective of peacebuilding. As Newman notes, ‘Human 
insecurity – deprivation, alienation and exclusion- is a direct threat to peacebuilding 
processes and objectives, since these undermine the legitimacy of peacebuilding and fuel the 
underlying sources of conflict.’56 As such tackling human insecurity by focussing on 
measures to realise human security as a priority for peacebuilding programmes would help to 
ensure sustainable peace.57  
 
In defining a human security approach the author firmly defines human security as an 
emancipatory model focused on meeting basic human needs and local empowerment.58 This 
human security approach to peacebuilding has evolved from basic human needs theory within 
                                                          
55 Wendy Lambourne, ‘Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and 
Reconciliation’, Peace, Conflict and Development – Issue Four, April 2004, 2. 
56 Newman, supra note 9,1740. 
57 Ibid,1737. 
58 Richmond. supra note 15. 
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the field of conflict transformation.59  Championed by John Burton in 1979,60 the idea that 
there exist basic human needs ‘whose fulfilment is a necessary condition of human life and 
development’61 is a compelling and enduring theory that has been examined and adopted by 
various fields of study including philosophy,62 social psychology63 and problem solving 
approaches within conflict resolution. Despite a lack of consensus as to the content and the 
universality of these basic human needs64 the concept has been central to a key predecessor to 
the contemporary conception of human security and human rights: international development 
theory. During the 1970s to the mid-1980s, progressive thinking around development led to 
the idea that development should not be defined in a pure economic sense but rather should 
be more broadly conceptualised as encompassing human development based on fulfilment of 
‘fundamental human needs.’65 Non-satisfaction of such needs could lead to ‘poverties of 
subsistence, of protection, […] of participation, of identity.’66 This relationship between basic 
human needs, poverty and human development was adopted and characterised by both the 
UN and the ILO.67 However, it was soon to be marginalised again owing to the rise of neo-
liberalism and a return to economic orthodoxy in the 1980s.68 As Avruch and Mitchell note, 
‘The era of structural adjustment as conditions for the IMF and World Bank loans, and neo-
liberal monetarist policies generally, buried the discourse of basic human needs in approaches 
to development.’69 Despite this marginalisation it is true today that the idea of basic human 
needs in some form continues to be central to the work of those within development and 
                                                          
59 See Burton. J (ed) Conflict: Human Needs Theory, London: Macmillan Press, 1990. 
60 Burton. J, Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political 
Problems, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979. 
61 Avruch.K And Mitchell.C, Conflict Resolution and Human Needs – Linking Theory and Practice, 
Oxford: Routledge, 2013, 5. 
62 Aristotle differentiated between human ‘needs’ and ‘wants’. See Ibid, 5. 
63 Most famously, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Ibid, 6. 
64 See Avruch and Mitchell, supra note 61, 230-235. 
65 Max-Neef in Avruch and Mitchell, supra note 61, 9. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Jolly et al in Avruch and Mitchell, supra note 61, 9. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid, 10. 
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conflict transformation and additionally in the field of international human rights. ‘The core 
idea of basic human needs is strongly reflected in discourses on human rights and human 
security.’70 Looking forward even in 1990, Bay noted the conjoinment of [basic human] 
needs to rights as ‘needs based rights: both universal and demanding of recognition and 
satisfaction.’71 Furthermore, the UN now has a dedicated unit for Human Security.72 Based 
upon a framework that aims to provide ‘protection and empowerment’, the UN Human 
Security Unit states that human security ‘promotes people-centred, comprehensive, context-
specific, and prevention-oriented measures that seek to reduce the likelihood of conflicts, 
help overcome the obstacles to development and promote human rights for all.’73 Moreover, 
as a framework, […it] has been applied to complex situations of human insecurity, such as:  
transition to peace and sustainable development in fragile and conflict-affected 
communities.’74 Clearly there have been developments regarding the adoption of human 
security as an approach to peacebuilding and development.  It is also the case however that, 
‘the manner in which human security might be applied to contemporary challenges both 
theoretical and practical remains underexplored.’75 
 
4. A NEW APPROACH: HUMAN SECURITY ‘PLUS’ – AN ‘INCLUSIVE 
HUMAN RIGHTS’ APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING 
                                                          
70 Ibid, 233. 
71 Ibid. 
72See UN Trust Fund for Human Security, Human Security Unit,  




75 Newman, supra note 9, 1748. Notable articles on the subject include, Richmond. O, ‘Human 
security and its subjects’, International Journal, (68) Winter, 2012-13, 205; Richmond supra note 15. 
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One way in which such an approach can be applied to peacebuilding is through the 
application and consideration of economic and social rights as integral to peacebuilding. A 
human rights approach to peacebuilding (similar to a conflict transformation approach) works 
to improve human security for all people.76 Some of the human needs identified by Burton 
(and others), such as safety and security of the person,  welfare or sufficiency needs, freedom 
needs77 and distributive justice in relation to resources, can be easily translated into human 
rights, in particular basic rights78 and consequently economic, social and cultural rights as 
enshrined in international law.79 Schirch argues that ‘the idea of human security bridges the 
concepts of human rights and human needs.’80 It is submitted however that the concept of 
economic and social rights (alongside civil and political rights) transforms human needs and 
human security into rights, whereby human security becomes a matter of legal entitlements.  
 
‘Human security suggests that public policy must be directed above all at enhancing the 
personal security, welfare and dignity of individuals and communities’.81 A rights-based 
approach to peacebuilding draws parallels with a human security approach, but there are 
significant differences: A human rights approach, in particular an economic and social rights 
model would share these aims but with the added value of enshrining such aims within the 
law. Fulfilment of basic needs and the dignity of the human person would become a matter of 
legal entitlement rather than policy aims to be aspired to. ‘Needs’ language suggests that the 
                                                          
76 Schirch, supra note 54, 65. 
77 See Galtung. J, ‘International Development in Human Perspective’ Chapter 15 in Burton. J (ed) 
Conflict: Human Needs Theory, London: Macmillan Press, 1990, 301-335, 304. 
78 See Shue. H, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Second Edition), 
Princeton University Press, 1996. 
79 The link between Shue’s basic rights to security, subsistence and liberty, and ESR is clear when the 
substantive content of ICESCR and other international human rights law provisions are examined.  
80 Schirch, supra note 54, 65. 
81 Newman, supra note 9, 1749. 
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individuals can be to blame for not being able to satisfy those needs themselves.82 It also 
makes them dependent on charitable help to meet those needs.83 Rights language on the other 
hand is empowering ‘bringing with it legal tools to enforce and protect’.84 In this way an 
economic and social rights framework takes the human security approach to peacebuilding a 
step further. Moreover, it can be applied within the prevailing liberal peacebuilding agenda 
that currently exists (by utilising existing international law and domestic provisions where 
applicable but prioritising economic and social rights rather than side-lining or ignoring them 
in favour of civil and political rights provisions). Newman similarly notes that a human 
security approach to peacebuilding while problematising and exposing the flaws of the liberal 
peacebuilding agenda ‘can be applied within this same context.’85 However, the human rights 
based approach has added value as it transforms the human security framework into an 
approach to peacebuilding founded on and consistent with substantive legal human rights 
protections. 
 
There are certain problems however with converting a human security approach to a rights 
based approach: One perceived advantage of the human security approach is that it may be 
acceptable to those who object to the language or binding nature of rights. Parlevliet has 
argued that at times needs language is preferable to rights language as it may facilitate 
dialogue and bring people to the table – opposing sides in a conflict may be happier to listen 
to the opposing sides ‘needs’ rather than hearing how they have violated their rights.86 
However, this problem could be overcome if economic and social rights are presented as a 
                                                          
82 Schirch, supra note 54, 89. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85  Newman, supra note 9,1753.   
86 Parlevliet, in Schirch, supra note 54, 89; Parlevliet. M, ‘Bridging the Divide: Exploring the 
Relationship between Human Rights and Conflict Management’ Track Two, 11(1) March 2002, 8-52. 
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win-win sum for all parties to the conflict and favouring none.  The basic and fundamental 
nature of such rights may help in achieving a consensus between parties, for example 
everyone needs adequate food and water. Also the focus at this point in time should be on 
future protection and promotion of rights rather than on attributing blame for past violations. 
These violations can be dealt within a transitional justice mechanism. If rights are presented 
as ‘needs’ it is crucial that once these initial discussions have taken place and progress is 
made that such needs are translated into rights to ensure future protection and promotion for 
all involved. This is even more crucial in terms of economic and social rights as rights 
language when used previously in peacebuilding efforts has been limited to civil and political 
rights discussions ignoring basic human rights /needs.87 
 
One further challenge is that framing this approach as a ‘human rights based approach’ to 
peacebuilding may be interpreted as maintaining the status quo; that is falling into the liberal 
agenda and interpretation of human rights with a predominant focus on civil and political 
rights only– rather than an approach which clearly challenges this agenda and views human 
rights as indivisible and interdependent.88 It is evident that if a peacebuilding programme is 
to address the idea of human security as its priority then a holistic approach must be taken to 
protecting human rights:  human security cannot be realised through the realisation of civil 
and political rights alone (even if one believes that civil and political rights can be realised 
without economic and social rights) but requires addressing all human rights.  ‘Economic, 
                                                          
87   Chinkin. C, ‘The Protection Of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights Post-Conflict,’ Paper for the 
UN Women’s Rights and Gender Unit (WRGU), 2008, 1-57,.8 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf last accessed 
05/11/15 
88 Supra note 26; Whilst this indivisibility of rights has been part of the human rights rhetoric for some 
time in reality states have been slow to afford equal emphasis and acknowledgement to ESR. 
However, this is changing: In the area of transitional justice the concept of interdependence and 
indivisibility of human rights and the justiciability of ESR are finally being recognised. See Cahill-
Ripley, supra note 42.  
20 
 
social and cultural rights may be implicit in or constitute the basis for, the realisation of civil 
and political rights and vice versa.’89 In a peacebuilding context for example, people will be 
unlikely to engage with democratic institutions and post-conflict politics if they still have a 
grievance that their social housing is inadequate or that access to such housing is denied due 
to continuing discrimination as a result of the conflict. Therefore, in order for these people to 
effectively realise their civil and political rights (for example the right to vote, the right to 
participate in public affairs) the government must also assist them in realising their economic 
and social rights (the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to social security, the 
right to health). Significantly, without ‘operationalising’ this indivisibility of rights the 
underlying sources of unrest and violent conflict can remain.   
 
In light of the previous misleading use of human rights rhetoric in peacebuilding90 it may be 
preferable therefore to deem this new peacebuilding agenda as ‘Human Security Plus’ noting 
the emphasis on economic and social rights as a priority for human security and a prerequisite 
for the realisation of civil and political rights necessary for the liberal peacebuilding ideals of 
democracy and rule of law. The inclusion of economic and social rights within a human 
security plus approach to peacebuilding will help to undermine such disingenuous use of 
human rights language and challenge the dominance of the liberal peacebuilding agenda (and 
the limitation of human rights to that of civil and political rights). This in turn will assist in 
making peacebuilding more holistic, effective, more truthful and transparent. 
 
                                                          
89 Mapulanga-Hulston. J, ‘Examining the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, The 
International Journal of Human Rights, Vol.6, No.4, Winter 2002, 29-48, 32. 
90 Schirch, supra note 54, 91. 
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Such an alternative approach to peacebuilding would also entail greater emphasis on local 
engagement which can make peacebuilding more legitimate.91 This is also true of transitional 
justice programmes where the importance of local and grassroots mechanisms for justice is 
well noted.92 Further, the human security concept of peacebuilding seeks to provide citizens 
with the agency required to bring about positive change in society and in their own individual 
lives.93 Local participation in peacebuilding initiatives is crucial to the success of 
peacebuilding programmes and finding a balance between international assistance and 
external control and local mechanisms and control of peacebuilding programmes (inclusive 
of transitional justice) is a challenge. The existing framework for economic and social rights 
can be helpful as the principles underlying implementation of human rights include 
participation, transparency and accountability94. Intervention based upon these principles can 
facilitate conditions conducive to enhancing local involvement. Moreover  there is evidence 
(Northern Ireland, Bosnia, East Timor, Sierra Leone) that in transitional and volatile societies  
significant numbers of the population ‘will seek to disrupt the peacebuilding process if they 
feel excluded or alienated from the process and if their immediate human needs are not 
met’.95  They may even turn to organised crime for self-sustainability.96  
 
 
                                                          
91 Newman, supra note 9,1737. 
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93 Newman, supra note 9,1750. 
94 Sengupta.A, The Human Right to Development’ in Andreassen.B.A and Marks.S, Development as 
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Trap: Civil War and Development Policy’, World Bank, 2003; Newman,  infra note 9, 1752. 
96 Collier.P et al, ‘World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, Breaking the Conflict 
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A human security approach places emphasis on addressing the root causes of conflict and 
resolving them rather than focussing on negative peace and containment.97 This means such 
an approach can address structural violence, inequality and discrimination and exclusion. It 
also allows root cause analysis and therefore helps in identifying early warning indicators and 
long term goals for peacebuilding programmes rather than short term aims. Similarly, a 
human security plus approach would utilise economic and social rights as a framework to 
address these issues through identifying the rights violations that have taken place and 
providing legal protections against such violations based upon principles of equality, non-
discrimination and special protections for vulnerable groups. This is not to argue that stability 
and security are irrelevant concerns but rather that meeting basic human needs including 
public service delivery, employment opportunities and poverty alleviation are also 
prioritised.98 Indeed, making these a priority will contribute to stability and security through 
emancipation.99 
 
It is significant that Newman also argues that a key element in the human security approach is 
addressing past grievances.100 He argues that ‘peacebuilding must [….] restore or build trust 
within a broader context of inclusive development and social integration. […] a human 
security approach to peacebuilding implies a process of “trustbuilding”.’101 Note here the 
parallels with the aims of transitional justice: in particular restorative justice. Similarly, 
O’Flaherty argues that the protection and promotion of human rights within post-
conflict/transitional societies requires both prospective actions and those that deal with the 
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past.102 He argues that peacemaking efforts should include measures to put in place human 
rights protections – ‘systems and institutions capable of delivering long-term future 
results’103 as well as those that address the past, for example ‘by means of a process of 
transitional justice’.104 O’Flaherty acknowledges the clear link between transitional justice 
and peacebuilding noting that past human rights violations need to be addressed otherwise 
there is a risk of ‘undermining efforts to establish sustainable human rights protection 
systems’.105  Consequently, it is clear that an emphasis on human security would not only 
assist in the process of peacebuilding as conceived of as a post-conflict distinct activity but 
also as a way to ‘re-connnect’ the disjuncture between transitional justice and wider 
peacebuilding106 therefore supporting an integral and complementary process with common 
aims and objectives: truth; reconciliation; peace and justice.107 The alleged dichotomy 
between peace and justice is not a new one.108  However, it is possible to envisage a process 
whereby peace and justice are mutually reinforcing and one way to transcend this dichotomy 
is to utilise a human security focussed approach to peacebuilding. Peace becomes the broader 
aim within which transitional justice is situated. 
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There will be those who argue that such an approach to peacebuilding is unrealistic, 
idealistic. However Newman argues a human security approach to peacebuilding ‘is not a 
woolly idea’.109 It is certainly arguable that, ‘Given the costs of protracted international 
involvement in post-conflict societies, an approach that improves project deliverables and 
helps to avoid an interminable international involvement is politically essential.’110 Schrich 
argues that one problem with a needs-based analysis is distinguishing between ‘legitimate 
grievances and illegitimate greed’.111 However a rights-based approach would provide a 
framework for determining whether grievances are legitimate. The existing violations 
approach and the concept of a minimum threshold within the legal framework for economic 
and social rights112 would act as a basis on which to assess claims. Also clearly people’s 
perceptions of their deprivation of needs will vary113 but utilising a human rights approach 
ensures all people are dealt with on the basis of equality and non-discrimination. A Human 
Security Plus  approach to peacebuilding can provide legal standards and frameworks for 
policy, clear obligations, measurable objectives and guidelines for the management of 
resources. As such it is argued that such an approach is likewise not ‘woolly’: rather it is 
practical and achievable. However, in order to operationalise such an approach there are 
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several integrated steps that need to be taken as component parts of such a peacebuilding 
programme which will be explored in the following section.  
5. OPERATIONALISING THE HUMAN SECURITY PLUS APPROACH TO 
PEACEBUILDING 
The existing framework for economic, social and cultural rights can be used as a normative 
structure for supporting a holistic model of peacebuilding, both by ensuring a focus on human 
security and through ensuring the protection and promotion of economic and social rights.  
O’Flaherty outlines a tripartite programme for the protection of human rights in the context of 
peacebuilding encompassing, normative measures, programmatic efforts and enforcement 
and accountability mechanisms.114  To operationalise such an approach to peacebuilding this 
system could be adapted to include economic and social rights as a priority. For example, 
normative measures would include ratification of ICESCR115 and other relevant international 
human rights law and incorporation of these norms into the domestic legal systems, either 
through constitutional or national law (as detailed below). Programming would include taking 
a rights based approach to peacebuilding programmes; humanitarian assistance, 
reconciliation, development and reconstruction, rehabilitation and capacity building. It would 
also entail facilitation of a participatory process involving local approaches to peacebuilding 
and human rights, as well as transparency and accountability. This would necessarily entail 
human rights education and training. Enforcement and accountability measures would 
include inter alia the establishment of a national human rights institution and adoption of 
international implementation mechanisms such as the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.116  
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As regards specific normative measures, if we thus conceive of peacebuilding as a process 
including all war-ending mechanisms we must first start with concentrating on peace 
agreements and the cessation of immediate violence. In terms of quasi-legal / legal 
mechanisms the first steps for parties in negotiations to end a conflict is some form of peace 
agreement.117 This may initially be interim provisions to be followed up by further permanent 
agreements, such as peace accords, bills of rights and eventually new or revised state 
constitutions. The essence of any peace agreement is concerned with human rights in the 
sense that peace agreements aim to end violent conflict and human rights abuses.118 
However, they may often contain explicit human rights provisions, mainly for civil, political 
rights but sometimes also for economic, social and cultural rights,119 as well as provisions 
which deal with minority rights, self-determination and power-sharing120.  
 
Bell identifies three stages of peace agreements with different human rights requirements: 
Human rights are usually limited in pre-negotiation agreements to provisions that limit the 
conflict and prevent further grave violations and to investigation of alleged violations. In 
framework agreements the human rights agenda is set: The legal dimension is outlined, such 
as provision for a bill of rights and corresponding institutions such as national human rights 
institutions, reform of institutions –such as the judiciary and police and partial transitional 
justice mechanisms .e.g. prisoner release. Finally, implementation agreements (which 
                                                          
117 Although there has been some debate as to when transition to peace begins e.g. is it when some or 
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implement the framework agreement and /or add further obligations), take forward the human 
rights commitments of the framework agreement,  operationalise the national human rights 
institutions and involve civil society in developing human rights. In addition, it may include 
the establishment and operation of transitional justice mechanisms (unified) such as truth 
commissions or tribunals. 121  
 
 In encompassing economic and social rights into this typology of agreements, it may be that 
at the level of an initial framework agreement economic and social rights need only be 
included as part of a broad human rights statement, that emphasizes respect for economic and 
social rights and establishes them as an integral part of the future bill of rights or constitution 
of the state.122 Then at implementation stage, the national human rights institutions or body 
charged with drafting a bill of rights or Constitution can elaborate the provision to include 
specific economic and social rights. 123  One useful initiative has been offered by The 
International Council on Human Rights, who have drafted comprehensive guidelines for how 
best to incorporate human rights within peace agreements. These include assessing economic 
and social rights violations of a structural and ongoing nature.124   
 
It is important however to remember the limitations of peace agreements, Firstly, peace 
agreements are not always enshrined as law and therefore if the protections and provisions 
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are not adhered to in some cases there is no legal remedy.125 Further, as Bell notes, ‘Human 
rights rhetoric only takes hold in a framework agreement if it serves the interests of both sides 
for it to do so’126. There is a danger that the ‘language of human rights’ is used within peace 
agreements but little substance changes.127 As such, in order for peace agreements to be 
implemented it is imperative that they are followed up by bills of rights and other 
constitutional guarantees, particularly for economic and social rights. 128  ‘Many countries 
emerging from major conflicts suffer a relapse into conflict within five years of signing a 
peace agreement’.129 Therefore there is a need to ensure continuity between the agreement 
itself, further constitutional codification and other programmatic peacebuilding measures.  
 
In addition, normative measures should be taken at international level. The peacebuilding 
process should provide for parties to sign and ratify international human rights law treaties.  
This can be initiated during preliminary negotiations, as part of a peace agreement or indeed 
can be incorporated into a bill of rights or other constitutional law provision at a later stage. 
  
For these legal guarantees to be implemented effectively, a parallel process of institution 
building and development of infrastructure is necessary. There is a need to determine the 
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practical steps to be taken to operationalise these legal provisions – a functioning 
infrastructure with the capacity to deliver services in order to implement  these rights is 
crucial, as is the provision of specialist institutions to protect and promote all human rights 
including economic and social rights. In order to challenge the supremacy of civil and 
political rights within the current liberal agenda, a refocussing of priorities is required in 
terms of development, institution building and reform and control of these processes.  
 
As a state does not exist in isolation but rather exists within the global international 
community of states, the influence of external actors upon transitional or post-conflict 
reconstruction in particular regarding resources is inevitable and often significant. Because of 
the limited state resources that are available in a state that is in transition or post-conflict, the 
role of international actors in institution building, development and reconstruction is crucial. 
However, international assistance is usually accompanied by various international agendas 
and specific conditions set by the organisation(s) or state(s) offering their assistance. Notable 
in the current climate are the policies of the international financial institutions such as the 
IMF and World Bank. ‘International institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund often push for market-driven reforms which may not take adequate account 
of the post-agreement need for large-scale public spending.’130 Even bilateral development 
partners ‘frequently operate outside a human-rights based framework or with an idiosyncratic 
one which reflects the donor’s particular interests and priorities’.131  Thus many peace 
processes involve transition not just from violence to peace, but also to liberal democracy 
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which often involves economic transition to a liberalised economic model,132 whether this is 
necessarily a good thing or not, and regardless of local priorities for peace and development.  
The foremost concern within this liberal model is economic development of the state, based 
upon quantitative statistics as a measure of progress. Whilst quantitative data is useful and 
has a role to play in overall development of a post-conflict state, quantitative statistics can 
obscure serious problems inter alia inequality and /or discrimination on the grounds of 
gender, ethnicity or race, or rural/urban discrepancies. Moreover the prevailing model tends 
to focus on institution building and institutional reform as an end goal in itself,133  rather than 
seeing the end goal as the effective functioning of these organisations and their ability to 
deliver their mandate including the protection and promotion of all human rights.  
 
A human security plus approach to transitional or post-conflict development would use 
economic and social rights as a tool with which to ensure that that basic needs and services 
are prioritised as a challenge to economic free market development, which may not benefit 
the existing marginalised or poor in the state. It would prioritise access to basic needs and 
services for individuals as well as addressing existing and underlying discrimination and 
inequalities (which may have triggered or worsened conflict). From this human security 
perspective the benchmark is whether the state can exercise its primary function of social 
protection, distribute justice, meet welfare and educational needs and undertake public 
service delivery.134 A human security plus approach to development and institution building 
would measure this process through the benchmark of a state’s compliance with its duty to 
respect, protect and fulfil the economic, social and cultural rights of citizens. Economic and 
social rights indicators can be used for monitoring realisation of basic rights of individuals 
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and can highlight problems through use of disaggregated data and qualitative data such as 
testimonies based upon a violations approach.135 
 
Of course, development of a transitional or post-conflict state will involve difficult 
discussions regarding budgets and recognition of the limitations of fragile states. The 
problem of meeting the immediate needs of the population in a society in transition from 
conflict to peace, is often compounded by weak state infrastructure, lack of finance and 
corruption. Although determining priorities will depend to a certain extent on the particular 
conflict in question, for every state it will be a question of balancing resources and of 
considering existing capabilities. However, it is imperative that where appropriate, priority is 
given to building the institutional infrastructure and capability to realise economic and social 
rights: for example, to realise the right to health a functioning healthcare system is required. 
This will often entail rebuilding physical infrastructure which has been destroyed or damaged 
in conflict as well as providing training in order to supply professional employees, all of 
which requires funding and resources which could be in short-supply. Existing mechanisms 
and provisions within the international framework for economic and social rights can be 
useful. If an inclusive rights based approach is taken to this process, the legal obligation to 
use maximum available resources136 and seek (and provide) international assistance under 
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Art 2 of the ICESCR137 could be helpful in acquiring aid and development assistance as part 
of peacebuilding programmes (rather than seeing it purely as a development/aid exercise).138 
Moreover, a qualitative as well as quantitative approach should be taken to generating 
maximum available resources139 and determining priorities for resource allocation, in these 
situations of resources scarcity. Skogly argues that much can be achieved without necessarily 
increasing financial means.140 Consequently, it may be that redistribution of existing 
resources141 and more effective use of resources could be more appropriate rather than 
seeking further international assistance.  
 
Additionally, the expertise and standards of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights142 could be utilised by those involved in transitional and post-conflict 
development programmes  to assist them in dealing with balancing resources and prioritising 
areas for development. For example  the concept of a minimum threshold could be applied in 
order that newly emerging states with limited resources could realise economic and social 
rights within their means.143  The UN CESCR could set state specific benchmarks (which 
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take into account the transitional circumstances of the state) to help the state(s) work 
progressively to realise the full scope of economic and social rights.  
 
It is also important that local communities who are involved in the conflict are also included 
in discussions about resources and priorities for post-conflict development and capacity 
building. There is an ‘empowering element where individuals and communities take an active 
role in the enhancement and creation of resources, rather than resources being apportioned to 
passive recipients’.144  
 
Finally in terms of programmatic efforts the role of specialised international organisations 
such as the agencies of the UN requires consideration. These bodies will often have been 
involved during the conflict, as peacekeepers, peacemakers and negotiators and in relation to 
humanitarian assistance. However, it is also apparent that many of these international 
agencies involved in peacebuilding, including specialised organs of the United Nations lack 
‘a concrete approach to using their existing resources for the implementation of human 
rights’.145 Schrich argues that an ‘agenda for coordinated action’ is required to optimise the 
rights-based approach to peacebuilding.146 It is not evident how the work of specialised UN 
agencies is coordinated in relation to peacebuilding efforts, for example how does the UN 
Human Security Unit or the UN OHCHR inform or overlap with the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission? Moreover, generally conflict transformation and peacebuilding groups are 
often working in isolation from human rights and transitional justice actors. Consequently, 
exchange training and increasing dialogue between professionals in all fields is crucial, as is 
the training of international, local and national NGOs and government officials.  In the field 
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of humanitarian assistance for example, if such assistance has been rights-based this is 
extremely helpful as ‘the groundwork for future rights-based reconstruction and rehabilitation 
[is already laid], both by building up relevant local human and institutional capacities and by 
establishing rights-based programming frameworks.’147  
 
Further, there is evidence to suggest that even the specific peacebuilding agency of the UN: 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission requires improvement in terms of incorporating economic 
and social rights and a focus on human security within their remit. The Commission has 
previously actively discouraged engagement with human rights (read civil and political 
rights) as a measure of peace, never mind consideration of economic and social rights.  In 
2010 the UN Peacebuilding Support Office stated that ‘[...] addressing root causes of conflict 
are normally long-term processes that cannot easily be measured during the time frame of 
most peace operations.’148  As such, ‘Peace consolidation benchmarks should not reflect 
broader aspirations for development, poverty reduction, and human rights if these are not 
directly relevant to the aforementioned objective’.149  However by 2012 the Peacebuilding 
Commission had altered their position noting that 
‘In the context of peacebuilding, a human rights-based approach offers a normative 
framework for stabilisation and development – one that is operationally directed to 
promoting and protecting human rights. It offers a tool to analyse the inequalities 
which lie at the heart of conflicts and redress discriminatory practices and unjust 
distributions of power that impede progress towards sustainable peace. Under a 
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human rights-based approach, the plans, policies and processes for recovery and 
development are anchored in a system of rights and corresponding obligations 
established by international law. This helps promote the sustainability of 
peacebuilding work, empowering people, especially the most marginalised, to 
participate in policy formulation and hold the State accountable.’150  
 
Moreover, they argue that ‘cross-cutting issues’ such as human rights should be 
mainstreamed through programming as this ‘can multiply peacebuilding outcomes’.151  This 
interesting development in policy and mandate seems promising. Yet it is notable that no 
definition of human rights is given. Within the publication no reference to economic, social 
and cultural rights is found within the main text of the document. Rather the reference to 
socio-economic rights is to be found in an appendix where it is noted that  
‘Economic, social and cultural rights [...] have clear ties with both effective public 
administration and the delivery of services. Gross violations of these rights have been 
among the root causes of conflicts, and failure to address systematic discrimination 
and inequities can undermine recovery from conflict.’152  
 
The report continues to detail the rights to food, education and health and concludes that 
‘Individually and together these rights contribute to peacebuilding.’153 Although this report 
appears to the indicate some progress from the Peacebuilding Commission’s previous 
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position regarding human rights, it seems at odds with itself as despite arguing that human 
rights should be incorporated into mainstream programming the discussion of economic and 
social rights is omitted from any major discussion within the main report. 
 
Most recently in 2014, the Peacebuilding Commission recognised that peacebuilding needs 
should be based upon an analysis of the root causes and drivers of conflict, including 
structural causes and they identify socio-economic inequalities as one contributing factor.154  
They also identify the most frequent peacebuilding needs as including inter alia support to 
the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education.155 
Yet these are not framed as economic and social rights in their mainstream programmes. 
Based upon an overall survey of documentation by the Peacebuilding Commission with the 
exception of the paragraphs noted above, human rights are referred to in the context of civil 
and political rights and rule of law only. It is evident therefore that economic and social rights 
are not mainstreamed in the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.  Although Sharp 
argues that one must be wary of overreach he also points out that it would be difficult to 
interpret the mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission in such a way as to exclude the 
mainstreaming of human rights concerns and transitional justice initiatives.156 It is submitted 
that these must necessarily include economic and social rights concerns as well as those 
relating to civil and political rights. Consequently, in order to pursue a human security plus 
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approach to peacebuilding much more needs to be done to incorporate economic and social 
rights into the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and related bodies. 
 
In relation to enforcement and accountability, parties to the conflict must be willing to act 
constructively to establish and support new institutions to monitor and implement economic 
and social rights. The establishment of a national human rights institution is crucial to this 
task.157  A national human rights institution has the role of establishing domestic human 
rights provisions for the state and/ or has a mandate to monitor and implement established 
human rights on the ground. It would also inter alia gather the required data to comply with 
international enforcement tools such as treaty monitoring and special procedures. It should be 
noted that states in conflict or post-conflict often have a problem with capacity to submit 
timely reports to such bodies,158 which makes the establishment of a national human rights 
institution even more of an imperative. However as O’Flaherty notes ‘It is important that 
their establishment does not distract from either the primary responsibility of the state to 
promote and protect human rights or the enforcement responsibilities of the judicial 
system.’159 This is especially important with economic, social and cultural rights as they have 
for so long been seen as non-justiciable. 
 
As noted previously, the ratification of universal (under the UN) and regional human rights 
treaties is a crucial element of the accountability and enforcement of the human security plus 
framework for peacebuilding. This is an important step that can be taken by the parties is to 
ensure they can benefit from and be accountable under various international human rights law 
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treaties. This can also involve in some cases becoming a  member state of the UN and 
therefore becoming subject to universal review of human rights (including economic and 
social rights) through UN Charter based mechanisms for the protection of human rights. 160   
 
Overall, the new government or interim administration will play a key role in operationalising 
a human security plus approach to peacebuilding through implementation of all stages of the 
framework – normative measures, programmatic (practical and policy) measures and 
enforcement and accountability mechanisms. That the general public and those involved in 
the conflict see a unified position is crucial for the new administration to gain the trust of 
those previously in conflict with one another.  By enshrining economic and social rights 
within the new constitution or similar legal guarantees and publicising the legal reforms they 
have agreed upon, the new government is demonstrating the beginnings of transition from 
conflict to peace and providing protections and minimum standards to allow people to feel 
safe and secure and to begin the process of reconciliation. In addition though, political will 
must be matched with concrete measures of institution building, reconstruction and funding 
for infrastructure and establishment of monitoring and accountability mechanisms so the 
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6. CONCLUSION: RECLAIMING THE PEACEBUILDING AGENDA: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AS A FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING 
POSITIVE PEACE 
 To conclude, this article has challenged the assumption that the liberal agenda for peace is 
effective and necessarily the best model for promoting peace in every transitional or post-
conflict situation. It argues for a reconsideration of the priorities for peacebuilding overall, 
with a move away from the dominance of free market liberal economics and civil and 
political rights to a  model for peacebuilding which prioritises human security and basic 
human needs through the realisation of all human rights as indivisible. It does however 
advocate a special emphasis on economic and social rights to redress the imbalance caused by 
the deliberate omission of such rights from the liberal peacebuilding agenda.  
 
It specifically argues that peacebuilding should be viewed as all war-ending and peacemaking 
processes. Accordingly the model proposed will help to reconnect the disjuncture between 
elements of peacebuilding, from peace agreements to post-conflict peacebuilding processes, 
thus optimising the protection and promotion of economic, social and cultural rights 
throughout the peacebuilding process.  Further it is submitted that to operationalise such an 
approach specific normative, programmatic and enforceability and accountability measures 
are required in order to refocus priorities on realising economic and social rights.  
 
Significantly the existing legal mechanisms for protection and promotion of economic and 
social rights can support peacebuilding measures. They can also address issues traditionally 
excluded from peacebuilding such as structural violence and exclusion of marginalised or 
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disadvantaged groups.  As Schirch notes, ‘The field of peacebuilding as a whole needs to 
create a long-term coordinated plan for addressing structural violence. The global community 
is lacking the will rather than the means to address issues of structural violence’.161 Ensuring 
the inclusion of economic and social rights within peacebuilding is one way to address human 
insecurity and structural violence within the current system and can be acted upon now.  This 
is an ambitious aim and one which will find opposition from the dominant liberal system of 
governance. However, through the use of the human security plus approach the peacebuilding 
agenda can be reclaimed, thus making peacebuilding more effective and responsive to 
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